SCOTUS Rules on Trump Immunity Claims

The Opinion in Trump v US – the Presidential Immunity case – dropped this morning. Your editor has been reading thru it since it was released around 10:00. It is . . . interesting.

The Roberts-crafted majority says a President is immune from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority. He goes on to say that a President has presumptive immunity for official acts taken while President. From the Opinion (internal citations omitted):

A federal grand jury indicted former President Donald J. Trump on four counts for conduct that occurred during his Presidency following the November 2020 election. The indictment alleged that after losing that
election, Trump conspired to overturn it by spreading knowingly false claims of election fraud to obstruct the collecting, counting, and certifying of the election results. Trump moved to dismiss the indictment
based on Presidential immunity, arguing that a President has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions performed within the outer perimeter of his official responsibilities, and that the indictment’s allegations fell within the core of his official duties. The District Court denied Trump’s motion to dismiss, holding that former Presidents do not possess federal criminal immunity for any acts. The D. C. Circuit affirmed. Both the District Court and the D. C. Circuit declined to decide whether the indicted conduct involved official acts.


Held: Under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature of Presidential power entitles a former President to absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority. And he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts. There is no immunity for unofficial acts. . .

This case poses a question of lasting significance: When may a former President be prosecuted for official acts taken during his Presidency? In answering that question, unlike the political branches and
the public at large, the Court cannot afford to fixate exclusively, or even primarily, on present exigencies. Enduring separation of powers principles guide our decision in this case. The President enjoys no immunity for his unofficial acts, and not everything the President does is official. The President is not above the law. But under our system of separated powers, the President may not be prosecuted for exercising his core constitutional powers, and he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for his official acts. That immunity applies equally to all occupants of the Oval Office.


91 F. 4th 1173, vacated and remanded.


ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined in full, and in which BARRETT, J., joined except as to Part III–C.

THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. BARRETT, J., filed an opinion concurring in part.

SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Your editor is not a lawyer (Thank God) but he does follow SCOTUS pretty closely. This seems to me to be a well-reasoned, balanced opinion. It makes sense that while official conduct is immunized, unofficial conduct isn’t. I wouldn’t be surprised if we see this case at SCOTUS again. While Roberts spelled out quite a few official acts in his opinion, the lower courts aren’t likely to roll over in this case.

While I have read most of the Majority, I didn’t bother with the dissents. Frankly, Roberts dealt with them quite well in his opinion.

I will point out that while dissenting opinions can and do get a little chippy from time to time, majority opinions typically do not. That does not seem to be the case for this term. There have been several instances of a majority opinion author chirping at the dissent authors. This one included.