It has just been announced that Ukrainian leadership has agreed to a 30 day ceasefire in the ongoing Russian invasion. The agreement was reached during talks between the US and Ukraine in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The Ukrainian acceptance is dependent on Russian acceptance of the ceasefire terms.
It has been a bit more than three years since Russia invaded Ukraine unprovoked.
As part of the ceasefire agreement, the US will restart intelligence sharing and weapons shipments to Ukraine. National Security Advisor Mike Waltz announced weapons shipments would restart immediately.
It also includes a ‘minerals deal’.
Keep in mind, this ceasefire is completely dependent on the concurrence of the aggressor, Russia. Whether or not Putin will accept this deal is unclear. Based on nearly all of his past comments and writings – and those of his proxies – it is very unlikely that he will accept the terms of this ceasefire.
It’s that time again. We’re going into Week 46 of the war brought on by Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. The overarching theme this week is national and international politics. That is not to say nothing is happening on the ground. On the contrary, a lot is happening, just none yielding visible results. In my view, if the ongoing Russian offensive operation in Bakhmut-Soledar were wildly successful, they would only produce about six miles of territorial gain and no avenue for exploitation.
This is why Ukraine and its Western partners would be utter morons to agree to any kind of ceasefire with the Russians that doesn’t involve Russian troops evacuating Ukrainian territory under the protection of UN peacekeepers.
Putin at Christmas
The official video of Putin observing a solitary vigil at the alter doesn’t scream enthusiasm or religious fervor.
As the USSR collapsed, the Russian ruling clique sought to maintain its world power status by creating a series of Potemkin “international” organizations that did nothing but make Moscow feel like it was important. The last vestiges are the Eurasian Economic Union, a dwarfish version of the EU, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CTSO), a bizarre and dysfunctional copy of NATO where the member states periodically attack one another.
Armenia and Azerbaijan are at war. Armenia appealed to Moscow for help from the CTSO. Crickets. Azerbaijan overmatches Armenia in every measure of national power, plus Azerbaijan is a close ally of Turkey. If Russia did try to send CTSO aid, it risked bringing the Turks into the conflict with ramifications for the war in Ukraine.
If that wasn’t enough, Russia also has a defense treaty with…Azerbaijan.
Small wonder that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan declined to participate in this year’s major CTSO military exercise, “Indestructible Brotherhood.”
Given the lack of military power shown by Russia over the last year in Ukraine and its refusal to aid a CTSO ally under attack, it is easy to see the CTSO members making more substantial plans for their national defense.
Given the structure of Russia’s military that does not include an equivalent to the Reserve forces found in most Western countries, I am deeply skeptical that this will happen in any meaningful way. How this many mobiks can be clothed, fed, housed, armed, trained, and transported is a mystery. I definitely don’t see how they can be converted to combat power in time for a spring offensive.
Contributions to Ukrainian Defense
While the US remains the most significant single contributor to Ukrainian defense, it is helpful to see what other countries are doing. As one might expect, the leaders are those with the most to fear from a Russian victory.
This war has shown that Russia is not the cyber warfare powerhouse it was portrayed as. While capable, the Ukrainians have managed to neutralize Russia’s impact on critical systems and launch their own attacks.
The Russian Army is designed to operate near rail lines. One of the first signals that the Russian Army’s logistics system was failing was when civilian trucks and other vehicles were commandeered in Russia and shipped to Ukraine.
Joking aside, if you are one social media, you realize the success this messaging has had with parts of the American right.
Everyone is Worried About Ammunition
This is the first week since about October that Ukraine has not faced a large-scale missile attack. Some of it may be due to Russia relocating its strategic bomber fleet to the Far East as a defense against Ukrainian drone attacks. Part of it probably is that Russia has run down its cruise missile stockpiles to the point that it doesn’t feel comfortable shooting them just to turn out the lights in some Ukrainian city.
I’d suspect that the dropoff is due as much to Russian artillery tubes wearing out — US artillery tubes go back to depot maintenance at around 10,000 rounds, and the Russians have been firing about 20,000 rounds daily for about 300 days. Still, the consumption rate, the losses to Ukrainian interdiction strikes, and the transit time from storage facilities in Russia to the front all combine to cause the reduced rate of fire reported.
The Russians are not alone in worrying about this.
The Secretary of the Navy “revised and extended” his remarks later (view thread). Still, he deserves credit for highlighting, in the face of political pressure, the fact that the Department of Defense has, for decades, cut our ability to produce ammunition in favor of multi-billion dollar weapon systems.
The question is which side can prevail in the long run. Last week I posted about Ukraine bringing its ammunition production back online. US facilities are ramping up production, though not with the alacrity one would have hoped. On the other hand, the Czechs are massively expanding their facilities.
Depot maintenance facilities are being stood up in Poland to refurbish worn-out artillery.
We don’t know what the Russians are doing, but my bet is on the capitalists in a war of production.
Black Sea Fleet Surge
No one is quite sure what to make of the Russian Black Sea Fleet surging from its homeport of Novorossiysk. So we’ll keep an eye on that in the coming week.
On October 8, General Sergey Surovikin, commander of Russian Aerospace Forces, was named commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine. He oversaw the stabilization of the front in the wake of Ukraine’s September offensive and the evacuation of Russian troops in Kherson Oblast from the right bank of the Dnieper River.
Surovikin is being demoted and replaced as commander by Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. Surovikin, along with Colonel General Oleg Salyukov (formerly Commander-in-Chief of Russian Ground Forces) and Colonel General Alexei Kim (Gerasimov’s deputy on the General Staff), will serve as a troika of deputies to Gerasimov.
No replacement has been announced for Gerasimov, so the assumption is that he will continue as Chief of the General Staff.
This all has a deja vu quality as Gerasimov was put in charge of operations in Ukraine back in April; see Russian Army in Ukraine Undergoing Major Command Shake-Up, Sources Say. Then, just like now, he was dual-hatted as commander in Ukraine while keeping the powerful post as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.
There are a lot of ways to read what is going on, and military competence has nothing to do with any of them. Surovikin had gained the confidence of the Russian Army in Ukraine and had the support of the seemingly influential circle of Russian milbloggers on Telegram. Gerasimov doesn’t. On the other hand, Wagner Group chieftain Yevgeny Prigozhin had praised Surovikin and talked smack about Gerasimov and associates.
Sergei Shoigu has appointed Valery Gerasimov as new commander of the combined forces group in Ukraine
This could sharpen the Prigozhin vs. Shoigu rift, as Gerasimov will work alongside Prigozhin favorite Sergei Surovikin
This is one of the more thoughtful takes on the situation. Take time to read the whole thread.
Today Shoygu and Gerasimov demoted Surovikin, and put Gerasimov in charge of the operation in Ukraine, demoting their most competent senior commander and replacing him with an incompetent one. This is a story that has it all: infighting, power struggles, jealousy /1 pic.twitter.com/yrhLN6qUwN
What is certain is that the rapid changes in command will do nothing to help the Russian Army get better. If military efficiency was the concern, then giving Surovikin a single deputy commander and a chief of staff that he could not fire would have been a better play. I think the thread by Dara Massicot is closer to what is happening. Surovikin and Prigozhin getting along was seen as too much of a threat to the apparatchiks on the General Staff.
The three deputies are ominous in their own right. If we assume that each of the deputies commands a slice of the battlespace, Surovikin will retain command of the South (Kherson and Zaporizhzhia), and Kim will take command of (Donbas and Kharkiv). Salyukov may take the role of actual commander in the theater, leaving Gerasimov in charge in name only. Perhaps Salyukov is slotted to command the inflow of men for the “spring offensive” Russian Telegram keeps talking about. There is another intriguing possibility. The long-awaited second front from Belarus may be on the verge of opening.
A day after announcing that Ground Forces commander Army General Oleg Salyukov is Gerasimov’s deputy for the war in Ukraine, Salyukov made a visit to Belarus. https://t.co/rb9jtwPV7Jpic.twitter.com/92211uPXXS
Is Pentagon playing up the rift between Wagner and Russian Army?
Wagner Group head Prigozhin has made no secret of the fact that he considers the Russian Army command to less than competent. So it is hard to see this statement from the Pentagon as anything other than an attempt to sow discord between the Russian High Command, Putin, and Prigozhin.
NEW: Russia's paramilitary Wagner Group is advancing at a faster rate than almost any unit in the Russian military in Ukraine: Pentagon
Wagner is particularly involved in the 5-month fight over the Donbas town of Bakhmut, where 80 percent or more of the pre-war populace has fled
Things have been tense on the Ukraine-Belarus border since the invasion. Ukraine has laid extensive minefields, erected obstacle belts, and demolished bridges to make any invasion from Belarus more costly. Apparently, they are also intimidating Belarus border guards.
Belorussian border guards saying on TV that they are offended by “the offensive threatening gestures” from Ukrainian border guards.
Imagine how offended they would be if missiles would have been fired from Ukrainian air space toward Belarusian cities? pic.twitter.com/wFnrNjr84A
This was the first iteration of the update where there was a significant merging of Politico-Strategic and Operational activities. Feel free to disagree with how I’ve grouped them.
The US Navy RIM-7 Sea Sparrow point defense missiles have been sent to Ukraine to increase its air defense network. The RIM-7 has been around forever and has recently been upgraded to the RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM).
Nice! As RIM-7 Sea Sparrow missiles are being replaced by RIM-162 ESSM, it makes sense to use the older missiles to shoot down russian drones and cruise missiles. https://t.co/bDI3QofsSF
What makes this transfer really intriguing is that the missile will be fired from the Russian Buk Transporter, Erector, Launcher, and Radar (TELAR) system already in use by Ukraine. The Poles and Ukrainians, along with Raytheon, have jointly solved the system integration problems. This means there is no need for a training period. The Ukrainians have already adapted the AGM-88 anti-radar missile to be fired from MiG and Sukhoi aircraft.
M109 Paladin
Several allied nations have sent the M109 self-propelled howitzer to Ukraine. This marks the first delivery from the US. As we have hundreds of these parked in depots, it has significant implications for arming Ukraine.
The US is sending Ukrainian Patriot crewmen to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, for training.
The Pentagon is bringing Ukrainian troops to Fort Sill, Okla., for training on how to use Patriot missile defense systems to help fight off Russian aerial attacks, @DougGWare reports.https://t.co/C0QK7JFOdA
Fort Sill is a world-class training facility, and I suspect that as the use of the Patriot in Ukraine will be its combat debut against a (sorta) peer competitor, they want the Ukrainian crews to be at the top of their game.
Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles
The US announced sending 50 M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV) to Ukraine. But they are sending them along with a battalion’s worth of soldiers trained to fight them.
NEW: Ukraine will need "a couple of months" to field 50 U.S.-provided Bradley infantry fighting vehicles: Pentagon
U.S. will train a battalion of Ukrainian troops at a time on Bradleys, DASD Laura Cooper said.
The Bradley is a beast. It is fast and maneuverable. It has a superb optics/thermal imaging suite. It provides great protection for the dismount element, and the vehicle armaments, a 25mm Bushmaster chaingun, M-240 coaxial machinegun, and two TOW missiles, can kill anything on the battlefield.
The fact that we are training a battalion instead of training Bradley drivers and gunners ensures they will be used the way they should be.
Marder Infantry Fighting Vehicle
Germany has agreed to send an unspecified number of Marder IFVs to Ukraine.
BREAKING: Germany will provide Marder infantry fighting vehicles to #Ukraine️. We’ll also join the U.S. in supplying an additional Patriot air defense battery.@POTUS and @Bundeskanzler are determined to provide Ukraine with the support that’s necessary, for as long as needed. pic.twitter.com/FHak6m9Uw2
The Marder is not in the same class (IMO) as the Bradley, but it is better than any IFV used by either side in Ukraine.
https://youtu.be/MRuvSZH9tLk
Tanks, Tanks, Tanks
In a meeting, earlier this week between the presidents of Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania (the Lublin Triangle), Poland’s President announced that he would transfer a “company” of Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine. No one is sure if he was referring to a NATO company (14 tanks) or a Russian company (10 tanks), but that is immaterial to the firestorm it set off. Finland immediately agreed to match the Polish contribution. The catch is that Rheinmetall, a German company, manufactures the tanks, and when they were purchased, they came with an End User Certificate (EUC) in which the recipient promises to not sell or transfer the vehicle to a third party without the consent of the country of manufacture. This is to restrict international arms deals.
Germany’s reaction has been a) we haven’t received a request from Poland, so we don’t have anything to say about it, and b) it is illegal for Poland to move on this unless Germany agrees. German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz apparently lives in fear of doing something that will make the Russians mad and cost Germany money. Increasingly, though, I think he holds a weak hand. For one thing, if Poland does the transfer, what options are really open to Germany? Economic sanctions against a fellow EU and NATO member? Refuse to sell weapons to Poland when Poland is already divesting itself of German military equipment? Carry out a false-flag operation at Gleiwitz and send in the Wehrmacht? Poland transferring the tanks while Germany screams would probably work in Poland’s favor and accelerate the decline of Germany’s political power in the EU. In fact, Scholtz’s own coalition is encouraging approval.
Clear words from Vice Chancellor #Habeck: “🇩🇪 shouldn’t stand in the way when other countries make decisions to support #Ukraine.” As Econ minister he’s in charge of arms export control. Scholz could in theory still block him, but it’d cost more🚦damagehttps://t.co/EFf9vbII4W
I don’t think the US will send M1 Abrams tanks because they are fuel gluttons, and it isn’t clear that Ukraine could logistically support them.
The Leopard 2 and the Challenger 2 are a generation or more advanced than any tank currently in Ukraine. Combined with the Bradley and Marder and the formidable array of Western tube and rocket artillery systems, they would give Ukraine the offensive punch it has lacked. If Ukraine could put together the LOGPAC capability to sustain an armored offensive, it would completely change the nature of this war.
Combat Operations
Suicide Drones
Suicide drones are commonplace in the Urkaine battlespace. They range from pretty large ones, like the Iranian Shahed-132 favored by Russia, to smallish loitering suicide drones like the US Switchblade and the Russian Lancet. This is the effect of a Lancet on a Ukrainian tank. “ERA” is “explosive reactive armor.”
Photo of a Ukrainian T-64BV tank that was reportedly struck by a Lancet loitering munition. It was defeated by the tank’s Kontakt-1 ERA bricks with damage to the grenade launchers and external fuel tank. https://t.co/ZO2Puah65bpic.twitter.com/12zqts0P2f
Russian Telegram accounts are crowded with video of Lancets attacking Ukrainian equipment, particularly artillery, and claiming destruction. The munitions are deadly against thin-skinned vehicles, but they seem to be much less effective against armored vehicles of all classes.
Don’t Try This at Home
This is a Ukrainian tank storming a Russian trench line.
A Ukrainian T-72 charges a Russian trench, firing into it at point blank range with its main gun. pic.twitter.com/adkfPfMBMK
While I’ll give the tank crew credit for guts, this is not a military operation. A singleton tank has no business careening about the battlefield sowing havoc. It should be supported by mechanized infantry. With just a little bit of bad luck, someone in the trenches could’ve had one of the crap-ton of anti-tank guided missiles that proliferate the battlefield. When all of this carnage was over, the Russians still held the trench line, and at some point, the Ukrainians will have to do this again. This is why the US Army training Bradly battalions, not just Bradley crews, has the potential to change the way this war is fought.
Donbas
The only significant combat news comes from Donbas.
For several months the Russian Army, or I should say the Wagner Group, has been trying to take the fortified city of Bakhmut with no success. In my last update, I featured a video clip by Wagner Group chief Prigozhin saying that Bakhmut would be virtually impossible to take. Since then, Wagner has focused its attacks a few kilometers north in the town of Soledar. Here is a map showing the placement of the cities and a situation report. The base map can be found at the link. Larger versions of the insets can be found below.
SOLEDAR /1330 UTC 13 JAN/ Wagner PMCs are reported to have expanded control over residential & industrial sections of the city. UKR forces have concentrated efforts to defend several key locations, notably the vicinity of the school, hospital and the access to mines 1 & 7. pic.twitter.com/TQ3O90dxi3
BAKHMUT/ 1400 UTC 13 JAN/ First reports of a RU breakthrough at Kurdiumivka occurred on 12 JAN. RU forces have advanced NW along the watercourse and are likely intent on cutting the vital H-32 HWY, UKR UAV directed artillery has taken advancing RU units under sustained fire. pic.twitter.com/wMVCgos6RE
The situation is very much in flux. The Russians have claimed Soledar as captured just about every day for a couple of weeks. However, more and more evidence does indicate that Russia now possesses most of that city.
What follows next is not talking down a hard-fought win for Wagner Group. The fall of Soledar doesn’t mean anything more than that. It doesn’t portend a more significant advance. It remains to be seen if Wagner can hold onto the real estate it has gained. I think the significance of the fighting here is political, not tactical. Just to the west of Soledar-Bakhmut is a ridgeline that is already fortified that overlooks a water obstacle. A complete collapse of the Ukrainian Army in this sector will yield about six miles of gain before the Russians have to do it again.
Prigozhin’s Wagner Group fighters did the fighting and dying in Soledar-Bakhmut. Prigozhin visited the front lines here around Christmas and was there while the fighting was going on. He was there for the victory, too.
(More color commentary on the whole story here and here.)
Keep in mind this all comes as the professional military is flailing about in Ukraine. While none of this, in my view, makes sense if Soledar-Bakhmut is a tactical objective. It makes a great deal of sense if Prigozhin is trying to show Putin that progress can be made with the right leadership…and that leadership is not available in his military. Or, if we want to play multi-dimensional chess, this is Putin and his old crony “Putin’s Chef” teaming up to shame the military into decisive action.
What’s Next?
There is a lot of talk on Russian Telegram channels about a Russian winter offensive. It is difficult to see how the Russians will pull this off if that is the plan. Training, arming, feeding, and transporting a quarter million conscripts and pushing them into battle under leaders they don’t know is not a task I think the Russian Army is up to. I’m still looking for one Ukrainian offensive over frozen ground (my guess is in northern Luhansk around Svatove), a halt for spring rain and thaw, and then a major drive in April to set the stage to end this war. This will be led by Leopard 2 and Challenger 2 tanks and Bradley IFVs in Zaporizhzhia on an axis from Tokmak to Melitopol.
I have little to say about the “Christmas ceasefire” and the attendant religious issues. But here is my take. Any trust in the Russians is misplaced as Putin and his toadies have proved over and over again.
Moving on to things I do have an opinion on, the military and political situations, I’m going to start with this; the SecNav is dead wrong about the Navy being impacted by arms shipments to Ukraine. To start with, very little of the mil aid to UA comes from Navy stocks. The shells for naval artillery, with the exception of the 155mm gun on the Zumwalts, are of different calibers and configurations than the 105mm and 155mm gun tubes the US has provided to Ukraine. The RIM-7 Sea Sparrow missiles, which haven’t left the US yet, are an obsolete system for the US Navy.
The surge of the Black sea fleet from the port of Novorossiysk could portend a new operation, however, it could also be the Russians trying to keep their ships and subs safe from drones and other attacks. Either way, it bears watching.
The replacement of General Armageddon as overall commander of the invasion force puzzles me somewhat. It could be as simple as political infighting within Putin’s inner circle, but, it could be something else entirely. I’m personally going to take a wait-and-see attitude on this one. It’s not like there is a Georgiy Zhukov or Semyon Timoshenko waiting in the gulags to take over the mess Putin created.
As far as Prigozhin and his Wagner group goes, I’m of the opinion that he’s positioning himself for Putin’s inevitable fall. The same could be said for everyone else in Putin’s inner circle, but Prigozhin’s moves are much more overt.
On to the new weapons systems. As I said above the RIM-7 Sea Sparrow missile that Ukraine is getting is an obsolete system for the US Navy. That said it is still a very effective point defense system. As Streiff said above, it is being mated to the UA’s own Buk TELAR, so no training needed. The delivery of US surplus M-109s is important, but not a huge deal, simply because the UA already fields them. The Paladin fires the same 155mm rounds as the Polish Krab, French Caesar, and the M-777 towed artillery that the UA is currently fielding.
The big deal is the delivery of Bradley IFVs. They are superior to any other IFV out there. Were I in command of a unit of Bradleys over in Ukraine, I’d use them as scouting vehicles, to find and provide targeting data to artillery/drones, not fighting pitched battles. And if I thought of that, you can be damned sure someone else has.
As far as operations go, I really do not understand the Russian obsession with Bakhmut and Soledar. That axis goes exactly nowhere. The only thing I can see there is that it is Wagner fighting there and they feel the need to prove something.
Many people have wondered what is going on in this war in Ukraine. What is real? What is propaganda. Who started it? Whose fault is it? What is true, what isn’t. Russia must be winning…right? If the news media is reporting Russia isn’t winning, how can that possibly be true?
In this series we will look at some perspectives that were not readily covered in the media or were misrepresented altogether. This series of articles will attempt to connect “the dots” whereever possible.
What this series wont do is tell you what to think. Information will be presented and you will be welcome to make up you own mind.
This series will not focus on sentimentality, as it will stick to facts over emotions. This will make some people unhappy, in fact it might make almost everyone unhappy. Everyone is welcome to express their thoughts and feelings in the comments.
This series will not be perfect. It will not be the “final word” on anything. What it will be is a carefully considered series of articles from military, historical, economic, political and demographic perspective. Hopefully nearly everyone will learn something and a few might learn quite a bit.
We will start tomorrow with where we are right now…March 4, 2022, in the middle of this war with Russia declaring they are shifting strategies and focusing on the Donbas. We will begin tomorrow with a post entitled “The Problem with the Donbas“.
