How Equality Destroys a State
America is built on the concept of equality, but that concept has to be understood properly to prevent the country’s downfall.
Dalton Henderson for American Thinker
The equality of man is found at the forefront of our Declaration of Independence and is considered an uncontested virtue of free society. However, disagreement over its implementation has raised the following questions: What exactly is equality in a state? Which things should be equal? Which should be unequal? What are the consequences? A nation’s concord depends on the answers — and yet today, these questions are rarely examined.
Historically, this was not the case. In Aristotle’s exploration in Politics, equality is governed by justice — the principle that each is given his due. But exactly what is “due” depends on the object being distributed. To account for this, Aristotle distinguished two types of equality: numerical, or equality of distribution, and value, or equality of proportion. The first is characterized by each receiving the exact same, the second by each receiving an amount proportional to his contribution, ability, or merit.
A just society requires a combination of both, each to its appropriate object. Any misplacement of a form of equality to a domain where it doesn’t belong is an error that, if absolutized, manifests in two extremes. The first assumes that if all are equal in one aspect, they ought to be equal in all aspects — e.g., if two people are equal in citizenship, then they should also have equal amounts of material goods or wealth. The second supposes that if some are unequal in one aspect, they should be unequal in all aspects — e.g., different laws for different classes or levels of wealth.
The question, then, is which aspects of society should be governed by which types. Citizens should have numerical equality in that which is innate and belongs to man by nature itself: rights endowed by the creator, equal protection under the law, respect, and dignity. A just state gives these things equally to everyone; they don’t require another’s physical production and are intrinsically owed by the laws of nature. Proportional equality, however, should be owed to objects that belong to man by action and do require external production by other humans: wealth, services, and material goods. These things are justly given in proportion to each’s contribution and merit in their acquisition, for it would not be fair for a man who contributes nothing to be owed the rewards of another man’s work.
This is not an argument against welfare from the state for those in genuine need, which can be a valuable tool for good order and prosperity. But to believe that externally created goods are owed by justice as a function of equality is a confusion between ordinate numerical and proportional equality.
When the state’s policy fails to align each object to its appropriate type, it creates discontent among the citizenry and the inevitable growth of factions. When that which requires man’s external production is held in common, or redistributed equally rather than by man’s contributions, it forms two competing groups — those who do more than their share and those who do less. As with anything that is shared, those who contribute more begin to feel animosity for those who do little yet receive the exact same benefit. Take a household with roommates: When one chooses not to contribute to paying the rent or maintaining the common areas, it very quickly causes frustration with the others who do — and the agreement to live together is often dissolved. In this way, the state reflects a household on a massive scale. Groups receiving benefits without contributing become pitched against those who do more but receive the same, or even nothing at all — and the stability, or the agreement, of the state suffers. On the other hand, when things that belong intrinsically are distributed unequally, there grows animosity for those who enjoy the special benefit of something that should be for all men.
Great thinkers for millennia have feared the consequences of faction and diminished concord among citizens. Regarding faction, James Madison explained in Federalist No. 10, “The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice.”
As long as human beings have free will for varying sentiments and opinions, there will be a separation of numbers into factions. But when factions grow too strong or too extremely opposed, there follows the abolition of constitutions, or enough change that it’s effectively so. The quintessential virtue that mitigates faction and ensures concord between men and states is justice, which guides and governs all good and ordinate interactions between distinct elements.
When equality is prescribed and applied irrespective of justice, it causes more unrest than it often seeks to prevent. A well ordered state provides all citizens an equal share of that which is intrinsically owed by natural law, while it regulates goods and services of external production to be distributed proportionally to each’s contribution. Misplacement of any object from its proper domain of just equality pitches citizen against citizen and inflames the power and risk of “this dangerous vice” of faction.
Dalton Henderson is a former U.S. Army Ranger and current graduate student.
Image via Pxhere.
